Finally getting the point, however incorrect. If one takes the point of view the right to life (personhood) is an attribute attached later (and not intrinsic or constitutive of being), say when a child becomes sentient (oh, at around 10 years old birth(?!)), then because this object has little or no value then opposition to abortion might be construed as controlling women in a way which is inappropriate. Like say, because you’re a woman you must always wear a star of David (which is in itself of course a thing of little value), but the exterior control (by law) restricting the liberty of the woman to wear/carry or not this thing is an unfair imposition. That is, I understood (before) the notion that right-to-life as an attribute to be assigned later allows one to permit abortion. I just didn’t understand the connection to “women’s freedom” or the “patriarchy” canard.
But if personhood is constitutive, it is a fundamental quality inseparable from being. Then, you’re stuck in my situation, where you can’t see any good reason for abortion except when it is the choice between the life of the mother and the fetus. It is not a controlling urge but an ethical valuation that says convenience is less important than life for every person. After all by analogy, it is not an imposition on my freedom if you point out that I should not be permitted to kill the people waiting line queue ahead of me. It might be “convenient”, but my convenience is not a lost freedom mourned because it is wrong to murder them. An odd thing of course, is that the same group that thinks personhood is an attribute contingent on other criteria claim that is exactly the same ontological error is being committed by many members of the other group when considering other (racial) issues. For those the question is whether equality is a constitutive not contingent/attached element (answer: right-to-life, dignity, and equality should be constitutive in my view). Go figger.
So, the upshot is, more and more I think the fundamental difference between the “choice” vs “life” groups is ontological. One side thinks right-to-life is an alienable attribute which is attached on an individual basis if a varied set of criteria are met. The other side thinks right-to-life is constitutive, unalienable with being. What I don’t understand are the reasons why one side finds the attached view natural. Hopefully the wrong conclusion (on both sides) is we pick the assignment based on prior belief. That is, first we figure that abortion is ok or not, which therefore determines how we view the ontological nature of right-to-life. In my personal case, I don’t think this is right as … well, I’ve changed my mind. Assuming philosophy is antecedent to normative ethics (that is our philosophy determines not just rationalizes) then there should be reasons out there why the right-to-life as attribute is preferable (to some).
One side thinks right-to-life is an alienable attribute which is attached on an individual basis if a varied set of criteria are met. The other side thinks right-to-life is constitutive, unalienable with being. What I don’t understand are the reasons why one side finds the attached view natural.
The constitutive side is arbitrary. I could argue with equal authority that the right to life is constitutive of fruit flies. You’re just declaring by fiat the conclusion that you want.
The reason the “attached” view seems natural is that it makes some sense. The reason people have the right to life is because they are sentient beings just as we are and we recognize the beauty and specialness of sentience, not that they fall neatly into some slot in some philosopher’s ontology.
“The reason people have right to life is because they are sentient beings.”
So, JA, I’m trying to figure your stand. Is it tihs: Right to life is constitutive for sentient beings, but being a sentient being isn’t constitutive of humanity?
JA,
Do you think equality is constitutive or attached?
Why does “sentience” make more sense? When is sentience acquired? A newborn isn’t by any stretch sentient. Does it have a right to life? Why? If it that it will develop sentience, well, so will a fetus.
Sentience is special. Humans are sentient. Therefore all human beings (currently sentient or not) get that specialness by right of being. That special treatment is unalienable (or not). Your point is that is is alienable. You can’t argue that fruit flies are special because no fruit fly is sentient. However, if one fruit fly exhibits sentience, then all fruit flies must given the same rights we give to sentients because any given fruit fly may show that same property.
When it comes right down to it of course, both points of view are “arbitrary”. I’m just wondering why you picked your particular arbitrary point of view.
So, JA, I’m trying to figure your stand. Is it tihs: Right to life is constitutive for sentient beings, but being a sentient being isn’t constitutive of humanity?
I think “constitutive” is something that Mark (or whoever) made up to convince themselves that their opinion represents some sort of Truth.
Why does “sentience” make more sense?
Empathy. Symmetry. Not superb reasons, necessarily, but reasons. This “constitutive” stuff is just hand-waving.
Sentience is special. Humans are sentient. Therefore all human beings (currently sentient or not) get that specialness by right of being.
FALLACY ALERT! There is an unfounded leap between sentences 2 and 3, based largely on the omission of the word “some” in sentence two.
However, if one fruit fly exhibits sentience, then all fruit flies must given the same rights we give to sentients because any given fruit fly may show that same property.
Your if..then follows no rules of logic I’ve ever heard of. Nor does it make intuitive sense.
When it comes right down to it of course, both points of view are “arbitrary”. I’m just wondering why you picked your particular arbitrary point of view.
Because it makes sense.
JA,
Ok. It make sense to you. Explain it to me. And I think we’re making small progress.
Please answer my question on equality. Is it constitutive or attributive/contingent? I think part of your problem is that you see no reason why any properties (with normative import) are reasonably considered constitutive.
I need to get my “links” out, and will have limited (if any) net access during daytime today. But tonight, I think I’m going to try to produce an explication of some of the reasons why I think right-to-life, dignity, and equality are all constitutive not contingent and why contingent makes less or no sense.
The “FALLACY ALERT” is not a fallacy if there are other reasons for which we consider this property constitutive not contingent. That sentence was written (and I thought that understood) that I’m of the opinion that was the case. Let me restate.
Sentience is special. Humans are sentient. That special nature is constitutive not contingent. Therefore all human beings (currently sentient or not) get that specialness by right of being.
My fruit fly as special “makes no sense” because the notion of sentient fruit flies make no sense.
Take the racial example. If one claims that Jews are sub-person (therefore not allowed right to life), you would have to demonstrate on a case by case basis that each Jew demonstrates person-like behavior in order to grant him person status. If on the other hand, personhood is constitutive of being, then if one Jew is a person, we must categorically grant personhood to all Jews.
Ok. It make sense to you. Explain it to me.
Rights, in my mind, are a human construction. (As I stipulated previously, if rights come from God and God opposes abortion, the discussion is over, of course.) One of the oldest and most intuitive moral formulations is, of course, the golden rule: Love thy neighbor as thyself. The golden rule is intuitive because fundamentally, your neighbor is the same kind of being that you are.
The “same kind?” I hear you saying, “doesn’t that imply constitutiveness?” I don’t think it does. Remember Jesus’s version of the golden rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” The key here is a recognition that inside your neighbor’s body exists a consciousness much like your own, that your neighbor has thoughts and feelings, too.
“Rights,” I think, are just a way of looking at morality. If it is immoral to do X to someone, then that person may be said to have the right to not have X done to them. As such, rights are contingent on moral questions, not on being itself.
For example, people in general have the right to life, but someone about to murder his neighbor may be said NOT to retain that right to life in that instant. Why? Because it would be moral to kill him in that moment to prevent the murder. It’s obviously from this example that rights are not constitutive of human beings, but may exist in some moments and not in others.
I think that ultimately, all of our morality stems from this idea that what’s going on in your head is similar enough to what’s going on in my head that I should treat you as I would have you treat me. Having something going on in your head — i.e., sentience, consciousness, or self-awareness — is then the key to determining who or what has the “right” to life.
I don’t see where “constitutiveness” comes into this at all. Do people have rights because of their DNA? Of course not. Why would DNA imply rights? People have rights because they are sentient/self-aware.
Sentience is special. Humans are sentient. That special nature is constitutive not contingent. Therefore all human beings (currently sentient or not) get that specialness by right of being.
Your third sentence seems to be a declaration by fiat, for which I can find no reason.
If one claims that Jews are sub-person (therefore not allowed right to life), you would have to demonstrate on a case by case basis that each Jew demonstrates person-like behavior in order to grant him person status.
I think you have this backwards. If rights are constitutive, then calling someone sub-human implies that they have no rights. If rights are based on sentience, all being with sentience automatically have rights, regardless of what labels one might attempt to put on them.
Consider an actual non-person like an unusually smart ape. I would argue that if that ape exhibits sentience and self-awareness, he or she would have the right to life. And you would argue what? That because of that ape, poof, the right to life becomes (retroactively?) constitutive of apes? Of primates? Of mammals? To me, the constitutive concept is an unnecessary abstraction which appears arbitrary and muddies the waters.
If there’s a patriarchy, it’ll manifest as control over the female body. That’s a no-brainer. Inductive reasoning leads many of us to believe that the p in that p>q is true for the pro-life crowd.
We see the anti-choice position merge too easily with the women-belong-in-the-kitchen position and reasonably induce that much of the impetus behind the anti-choice position devolves on the patriarchal impulse to control the body feminine.
A thought experiment: if there were some procedure that were totally harmless and could be performed at the birth of every girl that result in her being able to get pregnant only when she wanted to, is there any doubt whatsoever that the vast majority of anti-choicers would be against it? And that’s because the primary problem isn’t abortion, but women’s freedom to have sex.
jpe,
On the latter, “humans are sentient” is a statement about homo sapiens not any particular individual. That’s the difference (division?) between the constitutive/attribute argument. The one side evaluates “personhood” on a case by case basis instead a categorical basis.
The (or at least many in the) anti-choice position models the man/woman relationship as the relationship between Christ/Church as Husband/Wife. Christ was so controlling and dominating of His church that he gave his life willingly on a cross. How you get from that to “women-belong-in-the-kitchen” is a jump, I think.
I think the objection of anti-choicers to birth control of the sort you suggest has less to do with “women’s freedom” than an idea of the teleos of sex in marriage as not purely pleasure but a God given sacrament involving life, death, and new life.