A second claim made by many ex-Iraqi war supporters is “I supported it initially but too many mistakes have been made for me to continue my support”.
Reality check time, guys. The terms like FUBAR and SNAFU were not invented in this engagment. Indeed they enterered common usage in WWII, not later in our history. Wars have always had collosal mistakes on all levels, tactical and strategic in deployment and supply. Now perhaps the historically speaking virtually flawless initial offensive led to an in a mistaken expectation of a similar astoundingly smooth and SNAFU free reconstruction. But again, check your history books. Look at the Japanese, post Civil War South, or any other reconstruction. Recall for yourself for a moment what the acronym SNAFU means. Take note especially of the “N” for Normal!. It would have been the height of irresponsibility for example, the US to have withdrawn from WWII because, “Ya know, too many mistakes are being made.” Mistakes are being made seems to me an dishonest (or at least historically ignorant) reason to withdraw support for a cause, unless you can show that those mistakes are being made dishonestly.
The challenge for the pessimist is to point out mistakes and show how that particular mistake somehow is so much more egregious than errors in previous wars or that the “errors” are made intentionally.
Update: Alternatively, the point might be interpreted, if you can’t point to an “unbungled” war, then the point that the war was bungled is largely like saying, I can’t support the war because … it’s a war. Which is all well and good, if a shaky position, but at least be honest about it, please.











































A war without mistakes is difficult to imagine, to anyone who knows history. That’s not a criterion that makes a difference in this case.
One should consider not just the mistakes made, but what the ultimate goal is, or was. A popular management analogy for the Vietnam War was, when you’re up to your butt in alligators, it’s difficult to remember your goal was to drain the swamp. Sometimes a retreat is necessary to accomplish your ultimate goal — or to stay alive to even think about the ultimate goal. And while I do not think the Iraq situation is to the point that retreat is the only rational choice, without a dramatic turn by U.S. leadership, we will be faced with that stark choice, perhaps soon.
Stephen Ambrose details some of the errors in planning for D-Day, in his book about that invasion. The weather didn’t cooperate, and many of our soldiers were ill from seasickness when they hit the beach. The weather prevented the effective bombardment of the Nazi entrenchments from the air, as had been planned. The weather frustrated the effectiveness of behind-the-lines positioning of troops delivered via gliders. In the U.S. part of the operation, 32 tanks had been delivered to push through the barbed wire and other fencing, behind which our soldiers could gather and be ready to follow to take over pillboxes and other gun emplacements — but 31 of the tanks had foundered in their special flotation devices, and had sunk to the bottom of the ocean (often killing the crews).
The success of the operation came down to three men, whom Ambrose names, all of whom made the same calculation while being pinned down on the beach by enemy fire: ‘If we stay here, we’ll surely die; if we retreat, we have nowhere to go, and will probably die; our best chance for survival is to advance in the face of the overwhelming fire, take the beach (and go on to win the war).’
None of errors of D-Day were because Eisenhower, nor Montgomery, nor Churchill nor Roosevelt, had determined to do the invasion on the cheap. When the Allied commanders who would be on the front lines told Eisenhower they’d need tanks to get through, Eisenhower didn’t deny the tanks. No troops were sent into battle without helmets because the War Department had failed to order the helmets. In calculating the number of troops, Roosevelt didn’t step in to try a “new hypothesis” of warfare that said cut the requested number of troops by half, or by three-quarters. In the drive to establish a beachhead to get to Berlin and force the surrender of Adolf Hitler, Normandy was one of two or three top locations due to proximity to supply lines, proximity to a path to Berlin, and local support from an occupied nation. To get to Berlin, we didn’t invade China. To get to the Axis powers, we didn’t invade Mexico, nor did we invade Argentina.
In contrast, the errors in Iraq can all be laid on the administration in Washington, making such incredible goofs as invading the wrong place at the wrong time to accomplish the stated objectives. It should worry anyone that the stated objectives were abandoned years ago. How can we win a war when our leaders can’t decide why we’re fighting? This is Vietnam amplified.
So, to argue that the Iraq war is “normal” SNAFU misses the special way the Bush administration has prosecuted the war, from the outset as if they had planned to lose. Rather than rely on the best information about Saddam Hussein, and test all information coming in, the admininstration engaged in an Orwellian spin of the information they had. Rather than listen to the experienced military commanders, the administration fired anyone who offered any hint of dissent. Rather than ask commanders what they’d need to win an invasion, Rumsfeld dictated to the commanders force levels well below anything ever attempted before or anything rational under the philosophy of warfare practiced by our armed forces. When presented with new requirements for new armaments and armor, the Pentagon dithered, dallied and denied — Bush’s plan to veto the appropriation for additional personal armor was, in my estimation, treasonous and cause for impeachment, for example.
Once Napoleon determined he could not hold Moscow, he retreated. Now that it seems clear that our invasion of Iraq was for the wrong purpose (there were no weapons of mass destruction), that our occupation only encourages terrorism (incidents against U.S. citizens are up 20 times since the invasion — completely apart from the attacks on our military), that our occupation seems only to expose us to resource draining and further attacks, that our occupation will delay the establishment of stability, let alone democracy, in Iraq, and frustrate completely the establishment of democracy anywhere else in the Middle East, it is utterly rational to demand a change in leadership; absent a change of leadership, it is utterly rational to demand a change from the strategy and tactics of certain defeat.
Have you read Fiasco?
Ed,
D-Day is not one of the major “fiasco’s” of WWII but as you point out it had problems (how about the training losses prior to D-Day which eclipse by far the American losses so far in Iraq). Take WWI Gallipoli, the appeasement strategy, The Maginot line, German/British errors leading to Dunkirk, … the list goes on. There are errors in all wars, tactical, strategic, big and small. This war is no exception.
If you want to claim that the reduced troops were a bad idea, you have to show that the invasion didn’t work well, and it worked better than anticipated or even hoped for at the onset. It’s the reconstruction not the invasion that needed perhaps more troops. However, given the left’s insistence that we don’t have more troops I don’t get the point of saying we needed more troops. Reconstruction in Germany have the same political difficulties because Germany had been pulverized in getting her to surrender. Reconstruction in Japan and Germany took far more than 3 years and were fraught with difficulties.
Now you may mock Rumsfeld’s strategy, but you what you are not coming out to say is that what you propose would work is completely pulverizing Iraq, killing 1 in five civillians and 1 in 3 of her soldiers over a long struggle to insure that there is no difficulty in the reconstruction.
As you cite that Bush used “Orwellian” methods to fix the WMD data (but lacking any citation), how about the Orwellian methods used by the opposite side, i.e., Ms Plame and Mr Wilson on the other side.
You realize perhaps that there are plus’s and minus’s associated with armor, both personal and on vehicles. Increased weight, range, speed, and operational terrain are associated with increased armor. Treason is a resonable call on the basis of a judegment call which has good reason on both sides. That is, there are reasons for increasing armor and there are reasons not to. You seem to only see one side of that issue when in fact that is just plain wrong.
Attacks on US citizens are up by a factor of 20? Huh? Care to elaborate or link?
Finally, you realize when you call for a change in strategy/tactics that our tactics in dealing with the insurgency has been changing and evolving continuously over the last three years.
Ed,
Oh, I haven’t read Fiasco. Right now I’m reading (among other things) The Fall of Rome by Bryan Ward-Perkins.
My point on the SNAFUs of D-Day was that they did occur, but they are qualitatively and quantitatively different from the errors of the Bush administration. Eisenhower tried to get enough troops to do the job, rather than gambling the lives of Americans and the fate of our nation’s foreign policy on a risky hypothesis that ran counter to all the advice of all the experienced military men and counter to the philosophy of war practiced. D-Day foul-ups all had causes beyond the planning capability of the Allied planners. The success of the invasion, ultimately, can also be laid on the planning. Enough was done so that, even when everything else went wrong, our soldiers could succeed. That quality does not appear to exist in Iraq.
Just as one other example, Eisenhower prepared a memorandum lamenting the failure of the invasion, noting how much our hopes had rested on its success, and accepting full responsibility for the lives lost for no gain (and offering his resignation, too, IIRC).
Rumsfeld blames everyone else. So does Cheney. So does Bush. These people are not accountable, and not worthy to dust the boots of the men they send to die.
It is not necessary to show the failures of the invasion of Iraq beyond the obvious. Munitions were not secured, essential government buildings were not secured, the museums that held our cultural history as a civilization was left wholly unguarded for looting. The borders were never secured, due to lack of personnel. The “civilian authority” had asked for double the number of troops to secure the borders, but was denied. Gen. Shinseki (sp?) was forced into retirement for saying we needed more troops to assure safety and security for Iraqis — but he was proved right, 10,000 lives over. The screwups include disbanding the Iraqi army and police, the forces of stability — where do you think the “rebels” are coming from?
I’m not proposing that we pulverize Iraq. It has yet to be demonstrated that providing troops to an adequate level would not secure peace. The chances are diminishing, I agree — but there are alternatives well beyond bombing the place. That goes to the core of the Bush errors: We should have never invaded without the support of NATO and other key allies, beyond Britain. Had we worked to secure their support, there may well have been alternative attack plans. I am unconvinced that Saddam would not have taken a peaceful retirement in Marseilles or Tripoli to his current situation.
In any case, diplomacy is almost always preferred to bombardment. We have yet to adequately try diplomacy. Of course, in order to negotiate with some of the required parties, we’d have to talk to them first. There is little hope of such talks until after Bush leaves office, either by election or impeachment and conviction. He appears to lack the sense to resign.
Ambassador Wilson told the truth. That’s not Orwellian at all. It should be Christian, and we have fallen a far distance when we confuse things quite different from telling the truth with proper behavior, and when we claim telling the truth is Orwellian. You HAVE read 1984, haven’t you? The problem there was not that the truth was told, in any fashion.
No, there were no “pluses and minuses” dealing with the personal armor. It was supposed to have been given to our soldiers, but was kept away to hold the costs down for public appearance’s sake. Bush didn’t want to admit that the Pentagon wasn’t ready. I suppose one could argue that only about 500 American soldiers died directly as a result of not having the flak jackets they were supposed to have — but weight? No, that was not a factor. The issue was buying the things and getting them delivered to Iraq. They were held in warehouses by the vendors, who had anticipated the purchase, according to the needs the Pentagon had told them existed.
I consider it treasonous to endorse the orders to equip our soldiers adequately, then conspire behind the scenes to make sure the equipment was not delivered to soldiers, men and women, already in combat! There was no legitimate reason, according to Bush, to deny the flak jackets. Then he hid the fact that they hadn’t been purchased, and when mothers and wives started to hold bake sales to buy the flak jackets to protect their sons and husbands, Congress appropriated the money. Bush’s veto threat was bizarre, absurd, anti-patriotic, perhaps psychotic, and treasonous. It directly provided aid and comfort to the enemy.
Terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens are up about 20 times over what they were in 2000, according to the State Department reports. What more elaboration is required?
Our strategy has been evolving for three years? Let’s see . . . December 1941 to June 1945 was 3.5 years, approximately. We beat the Nazis in less time than it’s taken us to get into the current mess in Iraq. When do our poobahs in Washington decide a good strategy would be to win the war, and do it? How long should we wait?
Ed,
You keep confusing reconstruction with invasion. Saddam was toppled in record time in the method prescribed. “Secured the help of NATO”, what? Who? Get real. These men are not fit to dust the boots of the men who wear them sound nice, except that that sentiment is shared not by the men wearing those boots but instead only the left-leaning elite non-boot wearers like youreself. Should that not give you some reason to doubt your assertion?
I have never heard your assertions regarding the flak jackets. I (and we all I gather) have heard of armor on Humvee’s which as I said is a judgement call. I’m not sure I credit your claim on Bush veto, as he’s only vetoed one bill in his tenure (stem cell) and I’d certainly wish he’d had put the stopper on just a little more spending. But, in 100+ degree desert heat, flak jackets too should be, I would think, something of a judgement call. US losses have been astoundingly low throughout the three years, from the start through now. It is folly to argue otherwise.
Mr Wilson didn’t tell the truth, he fabricated documents. His testimony discredited.
December 1941-45 that 3.5 years counts is a funny figure. We didn’t defeat the Nazis, the Russian’s did the heavy lifting and it took longer and far greater losses than we American’s today can even imagine. The reconstruction took over a decade, and as I pointed out before didn’t have problems with resistance because Germany had been crushed. If you read accounts on what the enemy insurgents are trying to do, and how we are responding you’d know that we have been not behind the curve in dealing with them or their actions. And that there has been ongoing developments in both camps. They have been adapting, and so have we. But nevertheless, our losses have been falling and unlike that of the enemy. One of the results of this has been the enemy now primarily targets civilians and the nascent Iraqi security forces because it is less lethal for them, but it at the same time is counter-productive from a psychological point of view for everyone but the western MSM and lefty elites.